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Can One Party Appoint the Sole Arbitrator?

PS

10 min read

Short answer

No.

In Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v HSCC (India) Ltd (2019), the Supreme Court held that an interested party cannot be left holding the sole power to appoint a sole arbitrator. The Court set aside HSCC’s 30 July 2019 appointment of Major General K.T. Gajria and named former judge A.K. Sikri instead. The narrow exception is a genuinely neutral process—such as each side nominating one member of a three-arbitrator tribunal—where the parties’ appointing powers balance out. A mere one-day delay after the 30-day contractual window, by itself, was not enough to trigger Section 11.

Perkins Eastman Architects DPC & Anr. v. HSCC (India) Ltd.

Supreme Court of India · 2 judges

What the Court held

HSCC’s sole-arbitrator appointment was annulled; Dr Justice A.K. Sikri was appointed as sole arbitrator.

Decided26 November 2019
Case numberARBITRATION PETITION No. 32/2019
JudgesUday Umesh Lalit, Indu Malhotra

Original judgment link not recorded

The laws it applied
ActSections
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Sections 2(1)(f), 11(12)(a), 11(6)
The dispute

How HSCC's Clause 24 Turned the New York Firm's Rs.20.95 Crore Claim into a Fight Over Its Own Arbitrator

The story starts with a government hospital project. HSCC (India) Ltd, an executing agency of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, invited proposals for architectural planning and design for the proposed All India Institute of Medical Sciences at Guntur, Andhra Pradesh. Perkins Eastman Architects DPC, registered in New York, teamed up with Edifice Consultants Private Limited of Mumbai. The consortium named Perkins Eastman as lead member, won a Rs.15.63 crore award, and signed the contract on 22 May 2017.

Trouble came quickly. On 26 May 2017, six days after signing, HSCC alleged failure by the architects. A stop-work notice followed on 3 November 2017. The architects say HSCC officials were stalling and refusing cooperation from the start. HSCC disagreed. It issued a termination notice on 11 January 2019 and a termination letter on 20 February 2019. The architects denied the allegations.

On 11 April 2019, the architects’ lawyer invoked Clause 24 and claimed Rs.20.95 crore. Clause 24 created a long ladder: first a written objection to the CGM, then an appeal to the Director Engineering, then a demand on the Chairman and Managing Director for a sole arbitrator. The architects say the CGM decision was missing and the Director Engineering never discharged the Clause 24 obligations. They therefore wrote to the CMD on 28 June 2019 demanding appointment of a sole arbitrator.

The 30-day window expired on 28 July 2019. The next day was a working day, but the appointment letter came on Tuesday, 30 July 2019. It named Major General K.T. Gajria. The architects objected on three grounds: the appointing officer was the wrong official, the appointment was beyond the period prescribed, and the process could not guarantee an independent and impartial arbitrator.

HSCC’s defence was equally specific. It said the appointment was in line with Clause 24, the delay was only to the first available working day, and the actual appointing authority was the CMD even if the CGM conveyed the letter. It also argued this was not an international commercial arbitration, so the Supreme Court should not hear the Section 11 petition. There was no trial court or high court ruling below; this was an original appointment application under Section 11.

The legal question

The Section 11(6) Deadlock: Can HSCC's CMD Pick the Referee in the Architects' Rs.20.95 Crore Claim?

The legal knot was whether a company like HSCC could keep the contractual power to choose the only arbitrator in a dispute it was fighting. Clause 24 said no one other than a person appointed by the CMD would act as arbitrator. That made the CMD the entire appointing authority for a sole arbitrator. Under Sections 11(6) and 11(12)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a court can appoint an arbitrator when a party fails to act under the agreed procedure or when the agreed appointing authority fails to perform its function.

The older TRF Limited decision had already held that an ineligible managing director who was himself named as sole arbitrator could not then nominate a substitute. The question here was one step broader: what if the managing director is not named as arbitrator but is the only person with power to appoint one? The Court answered by reading TRF with the 2015 amendment’s neutrality principle. Where only one party controls the appointment, that party’s interest in the outcome infects the process. The exception is the ordinary two-nomination model, where each side appoints one arbitrator and those two choose the chair; there, the parties’ advantages are counterbalanced.

The Court also had to decide whether it could act after an appointment had already been made. Relying on Walter Bau and TRF, it said an invalid appointment cannot become a fait accompli. If the appointment does not satisfy Section 11 or the agreed procedure, the court may still entertain the application and appoint someone neutral.

The decision

The Perkins Eastman Rule: An Interested Party Cannot Hold the Sole-Arbitrator Pen

The Bench then stated the rule in terms that now control unilateral appointment of sole arbitrator disputes:

But, in a case where only one party has a right to appoint a sole arbitrator, its choice will always have an element of exclusivity in determining or charting the course for dispute resolution. Naturally, the person who has an interest in the outcome or decision of the dispute must not have the power to appoint a sole arbitrator.

That passage closes two loopholes at once. First, it stops a party from hiding behind its own contractual designation of an interested officer as the sole appointing authority. Second, it makes neutrality a condition of the appointment process itself, not merely an afterthought once the arbitrator is in place.

  • The Court refused to treat party autonomy as a licence to negate impartial adjudication. It relied on Law Commission Report No. 246: even if the parties agreed earlier, the law cannot permit an arbitrator who is himself a party or employed by, or similarly dependent on, one side.
  • The Court also said the real defect was not the one-working-day delay. HSCC’s letter of 30 July 2019 came after the 28 July 2019 expiry, but that technical lateness alone would not justify Section 11 intervention. The disqualifying feature was that an interested unilateral appointing power had been used.

For anyone searching for the latest judgment on appointment of arbitrator, this is the authority to cite: a sole arbitrator appointed through an interested party’s exclusive pen is not the end of the matter; the court can annul it and appoint a neutral tribunal.

Where you stand

Where You Stand Under Perkins Eastman and the 2015 Neutrality Amendment

  • Clause lets only the employer’s CMD choose the sole arbitrator, and that CMD is a party to the dispute

    No. An interested party cannot hold exclusive power to appoint a sole arbitrator.

  • The employer appoints its own employee or dependent as sole arbitrator

    No. Law Commission minimum independence bars a party, employee, or dependent from adjudicating the same dispute.

  • Each party names one arbitrator, and those two choose the third

    Yes. The nominations are balanced by the other party’s equal power to nominate.

  • Appointment is made by an independent institution or through a genuinely neutral agreed procedure

    Yes. The defect is exclusivity in the hands of an interested party, not appointment by contract as such.

  • The only problem is that appointment came one working day after the 30-day deadline

    No by itself. A technical one-day delay is not enough to trigger Section 11; independence and impartiality doubts are what matter.

The line to remember is this: check who holds the appointing pen, not just whether a date was missed. If one side holds the pen and has an interest in the result, the appointment is vulnerable even if the letter looks formal and even if the arbitrator is personally respectable.

What to do

Documents and Practical Steps to Apply This Ruling

  • Gather the contract and Clause 24 in full, the RFP and award documents, the consortium or lead-member declaration, and every notice that invoked the dispute-resolution ladder. In this case, the Rs.20.95 crore claim list and the 28 June 2019 demand letter were the trigger documents.
  • Keep proof that the agreed appointing authority failed to act within the contractual time or that the appointment came from the wrong official. The architects used the expiry on 28 July 2019 and the 30 July 2019 letter to show both the delay and the unilateral process.
  • If the agreed procedure fails, file an application under Section 11(6) read with Section 11(12)(a) and the Appointment of Arbitrators by the Chief Justice of India Scheme, 1996; here that was Arbitration Application No. 32 of 2019. The Supreme Court entertained it because the arbitration was an international commercial arbitration under Section 2(1)(f).
  • Avoid the biggest mistake: do not wait for the unilaterally appointed arbitrator to start the case and then argue bias. Perkins Eastman shows the court can annul a bad appointment before the arbitration gains momentum. The arbitrator finally appointed must also make the mandatory Section 12 declaration on independence, impartiality, and ability to devote time under Section 29A.

Common Questions on Perkins Eastman and Unilateral Sole-Arbitrator Appointment

Can one party in a contract appoint their own employee or choice as the sole arbitrator?

Not where that party has an interest in the outcome. In Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v HSCC (India) Ltd (2019), the Supreme Court annulled HSCC’s unilateral appointment and named a neutral former judge. The exception is a balanced nomination process, such as each side appointing one member of a three-arbitrator tribunal.

Is an application under Section 11 maintainable after the other side has already appointed a sole arbitrator?

Yes, if the appointment is not ex facie valid. The Court followed Walter Bau and held that an invalid appointment cannot be accepted as a fait accompli to bar Section 11(6). It therefore entertained the application and replaced the appointed arbitrator.

Which Supreme Court judgment governs unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator?

Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v HSCC (India) Ltd (2019) is the authority on this point. It holds that where only one party can appoint a sole arbitrator, that party’s interest makes the appointment vulnerable to court intervention. The Court appointed Dr Justice A.K. Sikri as sole arbitrator after setting aside HSCC’s appointment.

When can a court ignore the contractual appointment procedure and appoint an arbitrator?

When there are justifiable doubts about the independence or impartiality of the nominated person, or other circumstances warrant an independent arbitrator. The Court quoted the principle that the court may ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint someone else. In this case the unilateral CMD appointment power supplied those circumstances.

Does a one-day delay in appointing an arbitrator justify Supreme Court intervention?

Delay alone does not. The 30-day window expired on 28 July 2019 and the appointment came on 30 July 2019, but the Court said that technical delay was not enough. The real ground was the absence of an independent and impartial appointment process.

Why was this arbitration an international commercial arbitration?

The consortium’s lead member, Perkins Eastman Architects DPC, was a body corporate incorporated in New York. Relying on Larsen and Toubro Limited v SCOMI Engineering BHD, the Court held that the lead member’s foreign incorporation satisfied Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

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